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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COM-
P ANY, a corporation, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and W. R. 
McENTIRE, Commissioners of the 
Public Service· Commission of Utah, 
and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents. 
Case 
No. 7597 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision of 
the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
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In this brief parties to this proceeding may sometimes 
be designated as follows: Petitioner, The Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, as Rio Grande; re-
spondent Public Service Commission of Utah as the Com-
mission ; and respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
as Union Pacific. 
Union Pacific conceived a plan to extend railroad in-
dustrial spur trackage into an area in Salt Lake City and 
Salt Lake County, Utah. Under the plan Union Pacific pro-
posed to construct such trackage southerly from Ninth 
South Street in Salt Lake City along Third West Street 
(and over private property where Third West Street had not 
been opened) to Seventeenth South Street in Salt Lake 
County (R. 1-7). 
Between Ninth South Street and the north line of 
Andrew A venue, the proposed track would cross certain 
east and west streets, intersecting Third West Street. At 
the north line of Andrew Avenue the proposed track would 
enter private property and extend over. private property 
from that point to Seventeenth South Street (R. 1-7). 
The private property proposed to be crossed between 
Andrew Avenue and Seventeenth South Street embraces 
a parcel of twenty acres owned by Geary Estates and Rio 
Grande (R. 74). The ownership of Rio Grande consists 
of its right of way, 150 feet wide, extending in a north-
easterly-southwesterly direction, substantially bisecting the 
parcel (R. 105-106, 118-119). The remainder of the parcel 
is owned by Geary Estates (R. 74). At the angle of the 
proposed Union Pacific crossing its trackage would extend 
over Rio Grande right of way some 170 feet (R. 172). 
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3 
Rio Grande acquired the ownership of its right of way 
at the point of proposed crossing from the Salt Lake and 
Utah Railroad Corporation (R. 116, 118). Within this 
right of way Rio Grande has two tracks, one which it 
operates and maintains for the purpose of serving indus-
tries located in the area and for the purpose of interchang-
ing traffic with the Bamberger Railroad Corporation, and 
the other, an industry track, used by Rio Grande to serve 
Western Salvage and Supply Company. The proposed track 
of Union Pacific would cross said right of way of Rio 
Grande and both of these tracks (R. 117, 127, 152). 
A print showing Rio Grande's right of way and track-
age at and near the point of Union Pacific's proposed cross-
ing, the proposed track of Union Pacific, and adjacent 
streets and properties is attached to this brief as Appen .. 
dix A. 
On February 2, 1950, Union Pacific in furtherance of 
such plan filed its application before the Commission set-
ting out its proposal and praying that: 
* * * an order be issued authorizing the ap-
plicant to immediately commence the construction 
of said industry track as hereinbefore referred to, 
and that said order authorize applicant to construct 
and operate said track across said Ninth South, 
Thirteenth South and Fifteenth South Streets, and 
across Paxton and Lucy A venues, and across the 
spur and interchange tracks of the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company and the Bam-
berger Railroad Company. Applicant further prays 
that such order be made effective forthwith. 
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The application came on regularly for hearing before 
the Commission. Rio Grande appeared as a protestant. Evi-
dence was introduced by both Union Pacific and Rio Grande. 
As shown above, there is but one parcel of land lying 
between Rio Grande's track and Seventeenth South Street. 
This is the only parcel of land upon which industries might 
locate and which could be served by Union Pacific after its 
proposed crossing of the tracks of Rio Grande. Union 
Pacific called as a witness to testify with respect to the in-
dus trial development of this tract one N. J. Bowman, a real 
estate broker. Mr. Bowman testified in substance that the 
parcel (except for Rio Grande's right of way) was owned 
by Geary Estates. He had been working on the industrial 
development of the tract for about two years. Although in-
quiries had been received, no industry had decided to locate 
upon this tract, and the development of any industry thereon 
had only advanced to the inquiry stage. He had never con· 
tacted Rio Grande with respect to providing trackage to 
any industry upon the parcel, although the presently exist-
ing line of the Rio Grande substantially bisected the entire 
tract (R. 84, 105, 112). 
The matter was taken under advisement by the Com· 
mission and under date of August 2, 1950, it issued its 
report and order whereby the application of Union Pacific 
was approved and permission granted Union Pacific to 
construct, operate and maintain a standard. gauge railroad 
spur track over and across the streets in said order 
designated and the property and tracks of Rio Grande. The 
order further provided that Union Pacific should provide, 
at its expense, proper interlocking safety devices at the 
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point where such trackage shall cross the tracks of Rio 
Grande (R. 19-27). 
Union Pacific has not acquired any easement or right 
of way over the property or tracks of Rio Grande and has 
in no manner compensated Rio Grande for the proposed 
use of this property ( R. 30) . 
On August 17, 1950, Rio Grande filed its application 
for rehearing, specifying the grounds upon which it con-
sidered the order and decision of the Commission to be 
unlawful, alleging in substance that 
( 1) In granting the application of Union 
Pacific for authori~y to construct and maintain its 
track across the property and tracks of Rio Grande 
the Commission acted in excess of and without juris-
diction, and the granting of such authority would 
authorize the taking of the property of Rio Grande 
without compensation, in violation of the provisions 
of the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the 
United States; 
(2) The Commission failed regularly to pur-
sue the authority conferred upon it by statute in 
requiring the installation of interlocking safety de-
vices without making provision for the operation, 
maintenance, use and protection of such facilities ; 
and 
(3) There is no substantial evidence that any 
industry which may locate southerly of the tracks 
of Rio Grande could not adequately, conveniently 
and efficiently be served by Rio Grande and no sub-
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stantial evidence that public convenience and neces-
sity require the crossing of its tracks (R. 29-31). 
On September 6, 1950, the Commission denied Rio 
Grande's application for rehearing. 
On October 5, 1950, Rio Grande filed in this Court its 
petition for a writ of review, pursuant to which a writ 
was issued by this Court, and the proceedings before the 
Commission are now here pursuant to such writ. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. 
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO 
AUTHORIZE UNION PACIFIC TO CONSTRUCT, 
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A TRACK OVER THE 
RIGHT OF WAY AND TRACKS OF RIO GRANDE. 
II. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION VIOLATES 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF RIO GRANDE 
THAT ITS PROPERTY MAY NOT BE TAKEN WITH-
OUT JUST COMPENSATION. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION FAILED REGULARLY TO 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE JN .. 
STALLATION OF INTERLOCKING SAFETY DE .. 
VICES WITHOUT MAKING PROVISION FOR THE 
OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, USE AND PROTEC-
TION OF THE SAME. 
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IV. 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT 
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSIT·Y RE-
QUIRE UNION PACIFIC TRACKAGE BEYOND THE 
POINT OF THE PROPOSED RIO GRANDE CROSSING. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO 
AUTHORIZE UNION PACIFIC TO CONSTRUCT, 
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A TRACK OVER THE 
RIGHT OF WAY AND TRACKS OF RIO GRANDE. 
An understanding of the issues presented in this pro-
ceeding requires an examination of the nature of the author-
ity sought by Union Pacific in its application before the 
Commission. 
A reading of this application shows that the author-
ity sought by Union Pacific falls into two distinct classi-
fications, viz: (a) authority to cross a public street, and 
(b) authority to cross. the private property of Rio Grande. 
In connection with the crossing of a public street by 
a railroad, no question as to the taking . or use of private 
property is involved. The interested parties in such a 
proceeding are the applicant railroad company and the 
public which enjoys the use of the street proposed to be 
crossed. 
Exclusive jurisdiction over public crossings is vested 
in the Commission by the express provisions of Section 
76-4-15, U. C. A. 1943. 
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This Court has had occasion in several cases to con-
sider the nature of the jurisdiction of the· Commission over 
public crossings and the rule is now firmly established in 
this State that this jurisdiction is full and complete. 
Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 51 U. 623, 172 P. 479; 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 103 U. 186, 134 P. (2d) 469; 
Provo City v. Department of Business Regulru-
tion et al., 218 P. (2d) 675. 
No issue is raised or presented in this proceeding re-
lating to the public crossing phase of the Commission's 
order and that matter may be laid at rest. 
Union Pacific in its application and the Commission 
in its order granting the same treat the public street cross-
ings and the Rio Grande crossing as being in the same cate-
gory and a subject upon which the Commission might make 
an order of identical force and effect. In failing to dis-
tinguish the essential differences in the crossings involved, 
the Commission, we believe, clearly exceeded its jurisdic-
tion. 
In this connection it should be borne in mind that 
Union Pacific did not propose to cross the tracks of Rio 
Grande within the limits of any street, but rather such 
crossing was proposed entirely over private property. On 
either side of the proposed crossing are premises owned 
by Geary Estates, through which property Rio Grande owns 
a 150 feet wide right of way. We have, then, squarely pre-
sented the question of the jurisdiction of the Commission 
in connection with the crossing of one railroad over the 
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private property and tracks of another. In order to ascer-
tain the jurisdiction of the Commission in such connection, 
we believe an examination of certain statutes is essential. 
We turn first to the chapter on eminent domain. Sec-
tion 104-61-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides that, subject to the 
provisions of that chapter, the right of eminent domain may 
be exercised in behalf of the public uses therein specified, 
one of the public uses being for railroads. 
Section 104-61-3, U. C. A. 1943, provides in part as 
follows: 
The private property which may be taken under 
this chapter includes : 
* * * * * 
( 5) All rights of way for any and all purposes 
mentioned in section 104-61-1, and any and all struc-
tures and improvements thereon, and the lands 
held or used in ·connection therewith, shall be sub-
ject to be connected with, crossed or intersected by 
any other right of way or improvement or structure 
thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited use 
in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; 
but such uses of crossings, intersections and connec-
tions shall be made in the manner most compatible 
with the greatest public benefit and the least private 
injury. 
The above statute, so far as we are able to determine, 
appears first as Section 3843 of the Complied Laws of 
Utah, 1888, and has not been substantially amended since 
that time. This court has had occasion to construe the above 
provisions in several cases, and the proposition is now estab-
lished that, within limitations which have been prescribed 
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in these cases, a corporation enjoying the power of eminent 
domain may take for a public use the property of another 
upon payment of just compensation. 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 23 U. 47 4, 65 P. 735; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 
83 U. 545, 31 P. (2d) 624; 
Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. 
Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172; 
Freeman Gulch Min. Co. v. Kennecott Copper 
Corp., 119 F. (2d) 16. 
The Public Utilities Act was brought into our law by 
Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917. Section 14 of Article IV 
of that Act deals with the subject of the regulation of 
grade crossings and confers upon the Commission sub-
stantially the pow-er now found in Section 76-4-15, U. C. A. 
1943. Section 34 ·of Article V of the original Act provides 
that "all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this Act are hereby repealed." The inquiry then 
arises as to whether the eminent domain provisions above 
set forth are repealed by the provisions of said Section 14 
of the Public Utilities Act. We believe it clear that they 
were not so repealed, and an examination of the present 
Section 76-4-15 will so demonstrate . 
. Section 76-4-15, which confers upon the Commission 
the power which it undertook to exercise in connec-
tion with Union Pacific's application provides as follows: 
( 1) No track of any railroad shall be con-
structed across a public road, highway or street at 
grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation 
be constructed across the track of any other railroad 
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or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the 
track of a street railroad corporation be constructed 
across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, 
without the permission of the commission having 
first been secured; provided, that this subsection 
shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully exist-
ing tracks. The commission shall have the right to 
refuse its permission or to grant it upon such terms 
and conditions as it may prescribe~ 
(2) The Commission shall have the ~xclusive 
power to determine and prescribe the manner, in-
cluding the particular point of crossing, and the 
terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use 
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by 
another railroad or street railroad, and of a street 
railroad by a railroad and of each crossing of a 
public road or highway by a railroad or street rail-
road, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and 
to alter or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the 
use of such crossings to certain types of traffic in 
the interest of public safety and is. vested with power 
and it shall be its duty to designate the railroad 
crossings to be traversed by school busses and motor 
vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, 
where in its judgment it would be practicable, a 
separation of grades at any such crossing hereto-
fore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the 
terms upon which such separation shall be made and 
the proportions in which the expense of the altera-
tion or abolition of such crossings or the separation 
of such grades shall be divided between the railroad 
or street railroad corporations. affected, or between 
such corporations and the state, county, municipality 
or other public authority in interest. 
(3) Whenever the commission shall find that 
public convenience and necessity demand the estab-
lishment, creation or construction of a crossing of 
a street or highway over, under or upon the tracks 
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or lines of any public utility, the commission may by 
order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and 
such crossing shall thereupon become a public high-
way and crossing. 
We are here concerned with subsections (1) and (2) 
of the above section. Considering first subsection (1), 
that section, it seems to us, is in the nature of a prohibition. 
It does not empower the Commission to grant one railroad 
authority to cross another but imposes as· a condition to 
such crossing the permission of the Commission. In other 
·words, it is necessary, in order to accomplish such a cross-
ing, that the Commission give its consent, but the giving 
of a consent, in and of itself, does not enable one railroad 
to cross another. 
In examining subsection (2) we find the actual juris-
diction of the Commission. The first clause of that sub-
section to us is persuasive. It confers upon the Commission 
exclusive power to do certain things, namely, to prescribe 
the manner, including the particular point of crossing and 
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and 
protection of each crossing of one railroad by another. No-
w here in this section does the Legislature confer upon the 
··Commission authority to grant one railroad the right to 
cross the right of way, property, or tracks of another. That 
right must come from another source and that source is, 
we think, clearly either from voluntary grant or conveyance 
or by exercise of the power of eminent domain under the 
provisions of Section 104-61-3, supra. This being so, juris-
diction is, we think, in these matters now clearly divided as 
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follows: The Commission, under said Section 76-4-15, has 
the power to determine and prescribe the point at which 
one railroad may cross another at grade and the terms 
of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection 
of such crossing. The courts have the power under said 
Chapter 61 over the acquisition of the necessary property 
rights and the compensation which must be paid for these 
rights in connection with any such crossing. 
A brief exploration into the field of eminent domain 
will demonstrate the underlying reason behind the division 
of jurisdiction between the courts and the Commission re-
specting the crossing by one railroad of the property and 
tracks of another. In the construction of its line, a railroad 
corporation enjoys for ordinary purposes the right of the 
determination of the location and route which its tracks 
will take. 
1 Lewis Eminent Domain ( 3rd Ed.), Section 
390; 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., supra. 
This right of location is essential to the practical con-
struction of a railroad, otherwise the builders of a railroad 
passing through numerous parcels of privately owned land 
would have no means of effectively controlling the location 
of their trackage. When it is proposed, however, that one 
railroad shall be constructed over the property and track-
age of another, problems of an entirely different character 
are presented. These problems relate to matters of public 
safety, public convenience and necessity, and physical 
operations of the railroads involved. Consequently the 
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Legislature· saw fit in the crossing of one railroad by an-
other to withdraw from the constructing line the power 
of location of route which it would otherwise enjoy and 
to vest that power in the Commission. 
The location of route· may be a factor which will in-
fluence the amount of compensation which a railroad may 
be required to pay when it crosses the, property of a land 
owner or the property of another railroad, but location of 
route is a matter wholly distinct from the judicial problem 
of determining the compensation to be paid for the taking 
of the property employed. It thus appears clear that the 
function and jurisdiction of the Commission in cases such 
as here presented is very limited and restricted. It relates 
only to the determination of the point at which crossing may 
be made and the conditions which may be imposed in con-
nection with the installation of safety devices at the cross-
ing. Matters in connection with acquisition of property and 
the payment of compensation rest, where they have always 
rested, in the courts. 
The sol uti on of the problem here presented is, we be-
lieve, readily found in a careful examination of the con-
trolling statutes alone. We have found no case in which 
this Court has construed Section 76-4-15 in relation to the 
issues raised on this review. The decision in Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., supra, is, 
however, in point. In that case it appears that Congress 
enacted a measure to aid in the construction of telegraph 
lines. Under the provisions of the Act corporations organ-
ized for the purpose of transmitting messages and con-
ducting a telegraph business, upon acceptance of the pro-
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visions of the Act, were given the right to erect their lines 
upon post roads. Railroads were made post roads by the 
further provisions of the Act. The telegraph company had 
duly accepted the provisions of the Act, and the Postmaster 
General had executed a certificate to this effect. The court 
points out that the Act is auxiliary to state law and compli-
ance with the Act qualifies the telegraph company to exercise 
the power to acquire its necessary easements by eminent 
domain, saying in part: 
* * * By accepting the provisions of this 
act, respondent is given the right to erect its tele-
graph lines upon all post roads; and by section 3964 
of the Revised Statutes of the United States all rail-
roads are made post roads. But, before respondent 
can exercise the right thus granted by congress, it 
must have fixed and paid to the appellant just com-
pensation for the easement. This is ascertained by 
resorting to the state law relative to eminent do-
main. The state law becomes auxiliary to the act 
of congress, and provides the method of condemn-
ation and compensation. In other words, a right is 
given by this act of congress, and the remedy is fur-
nished by the laws of the state. 
In princi pie the situation is no different here. The 
Public Utilities Act is auxiliary to the eminent domain 
chapter. In the matter of the crossing proposed by Union 
Pacific, the orde,r of the Commission affords Union Pacific 
a clearance which may enable it to then proceed to under-
take the acquisition of the necessary property rights. 
The Commission is an administrative body, clothed 
by the Legislature with the power to regulate public util-
ities of the State. 
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Utah Copper Co. v. Publie Utilities Commission 
of Utah et al., 59 U. 191, 203 P. 627. 
The Commission's jurisdiction under Section 76-4-15 
is incident to that power of regulation. The taking of 
property under the power of eminent domain is a judicial 
function, protected by all those carefully enacted and pre-
served safeguards which time and experience have found to 
be essential in connection with the taking of private prop-
erty for a public use. Even if the Legislature had the con-
stitutional power to do so, there is nothing in the statutes 
involved to indicate an intention to clothe the Commission 
with such a .judicial function. 
The Commission in its order makes no distinction be-
tween its general jurisdiction over public crossings and its 
very limited jurisdiction over the private crossing proposed. 
By the very broad language of its general order, the Com-
mission undertook to grant the prayer of the Union Pacific 
application in its entirety and without restriction, thereby 
purporting to clothe Union Pacific with authority to enter 
upon, take and use the private property of Rio Grande. In 
so doing the Commission acted unlawfully and exceeded the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. 
II. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION VIOLATES 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF RIO GRANDE 
THAT ITS PROPERTY MAY NOT BE TAKEN WITH-
OUT JUST COMPENSATION. 
Consideration of this point requires an examination of 
the application of Union Pacific filed before the Commis-
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sion, the order sought by the prayer of this application, 
and the effect of the Commission's order in granting the 
application. 
In paragraph 7 of its application, Union Pacific 
describes the center line of its proposed track. The final 
paragraph of that description delineates the track from the 
north line of Andrew Avenue to Seventeenth South Street 
as follows: 
From the north line of Andrew Avenue .the 
center line of said proposed track as it extends 
southerly will leave the limits of Salt Lake City, 
and between said point and Seventeenth South Street 
the same will be constructed over and upon private 
land and right of way therefor will be granted to 
applicant by private owners. However, in the vicin-
ity of Van Buren Avenue said trackage as projected 
will cross a spur track and interchange track owned 
by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Com-
pany, as shown by the print attached hereto. 
This paragraph indicates that Union Pacific intended 
to acquire by grant its right of way over the property of 
Geary Estates but evidences no such intention with respect 
to acquiring an easement across the property of Rio Grande, 
although, as we have pointed out, Union Pacific would not 
only cross two tracks within Rio Grande's right of way but 
would extend its proposed track some one hundred seventy 
feet within the limits of such right of way. 
Union Pacific prays for an order authorizing it to 
immediately commence the construction of the track and to 
construct and operate the same over the streets designated 
and the property of Rio Grande and that such order be made 
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effective forthwith. It seems unreasonable to doubt that 
Union Pacific intended that the force and effect of the 
proposed order would empower it immediately to lay its 
tracks across the public streets involved and over and across 
the property and tracks of Rio Grande. The Commission 
orders that 
* * * the application of Union Pacific Rail-
road Company for permission to construct, operate 
and maintain a standard gauge railroad spur track 
* * * is hereby approved and granted. 
No limitations or restrictions upon the prayer of the 
application are here imposed. The further order of the 
Commission requires the installation of safety devices but 
does not otherwise restrict the authority or right of Union 
Pacific. 
We have here, then, a case in which the Commission has 
granted Union Pacific the right immediately to construct 
and operate a track over the privately owned right of way, 
tracks and property of Rio Grande, with no suggestion what-
ever that Rio Grande should or might be entitled in any 
manner to compensation for the taking of its. property. 
That Rio Grande has neither granted any right or easement 
to Union Pacific nor in any manner received compensation 
from Union Pacific is not in dispute. 
To further urge upon this Court the argument that 
the Commission's order would enable Union Pacific to take 
without compensation the property of Rio Grande, in viola-
tion of the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, 
is to labor a point we think wholly unnecessary. 
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III. 
THE COMMISSION FAILED REGULARLY TO 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY IN ORDERING THE IN-
STALLATION OF INTERLOCKING SAFETY DE-
VICES WITHOUT MAKING PROVISION FOR THE 
OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, USE AND PROTEC-
TION OF THE SAME. 
A consideration of this point requires a further ex-
amination of Section 76-4-15. As our previous discussion 
has shown, the Commission is by this section vested with 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters. 
One subject over which the Commission enjoys ex-
clusive jurisdiction is the facilities incident to railroad 
crossings. The essential language of the statute relating to 
that subject is as follows : 
The Commission shall have the exclusive power 
to determine and prescribe the terms of installa-
tion, operation, maintenance, use and protection of 
each crossing of one railroad by another railroad. 
From the foregoing language it is seen that the terms 
which the Commission is empowered to prescribe relate to 
installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection. 
An analysis of this language shows that each of these terms 
is related to the other and that the duty of the Commission 
is to prescribe with respect to all of these terms in their 
entirety and not to each separately; otherwise the language 
of the statute would have been installation, operation, 
mainte·nance, use or protection. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
The facilities at crossings with which the Commission 
is essentially concerned are safety devices. The Commis-
sion, in connection with the Union Pacific application, as-
sumed jurisdiction with respect to the subject of safety 
devices, and a portion of its order relates to such devices. 
This subject, being within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, its order cannot be disturbed by this Court unless the 
Commission failed regularly to pursue its authority or its 
order is capricious or arbitrary. 
Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, 
6'7 U. 222, ·247 P. 2:84. . 
The order of the Commission on this matter is in sub-
stance that Union Pacific shall provide, at its expense, 
proper interlocking safety devices at the point of its pro-
posed crossing with Rio Grande. In requiring that Union 
Pacific provide the devices, the Commission has required 
Union Pacific in effect to install and supply the same and 
has accordingly dealt with the first term of the language 
of the statute quoted above, namely, installation. The 
Commission has. in no manner, however, dealt with the 
other terms of the statute with respect to such devices, 
namely, operation, maintenance, use and protection. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the installa-
tion of inter locking safety devices is but the first and in 
many ways the least important phase· of their entire opera-
tion. These devices require the constant employment of 
energy, man power and technical skill in connection with 
their operation. They need constant and careful mainten-
ance and repair, and the entire facility must be carefully 
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preserved and protected. Furthermore the use of such facil-
ities requires an order of a regulatory body or agreement 
with respect to priority of movement of trains and cars 
over the crossing and division of expense and charges in 
connection with the entire facility. To prescribe the terms 
of installation of such devices, with no provision whatever 
for operation, maintenance, use and protection, is to force 
the parties into a relationship which can only lead to un-
certainty, confusion and expense. 
Judicial experience through the years has developed 
the sound principle that if a judicial body or tribunal as-
sumes jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action or 
proceeding, it should extend its inquiry and jurisdiction to 
afford complete relief to the parties. This is such a funda-
mental proposition that no citation in support thereof is 
necessary. 
It may be suggested in defense of the order of the 
Commission that, if the same be otherwise lawful, it should 
be sustained, and if the railroads involved cannot, after in-
stallation of the safety devices, agree with respect to the 
matters of operation, maintenance, use and. protection of the 
same, that a further application may be made to this Com-
mission to determine the division of expense with respect to 
these matters. Such a suggestion, in our opinion, only 
serves more clearly to demonstrate the impropriety of the 
Commission's order. Obviously the Commission should not 
exercise its jurisdiction piecemeal. At the outset the Com-
mission should determine and make an appropriate order 
with respect to all matters and issues which may be neces-
sary to afford the interested parties complete and proper 
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relief. Any party deeming itself aggrieved by such an 
order can then have a full and adequate review of the pro-
ceedings of the Commission. Certainly neither of the Rail-
roads here involved can now know what terms or conditions 
might be imposed at a future date by the Commission in 
connection with the proposed crossing; and to allow the 
crossing to be· made and one of the parties to install the 
crossing facilities without knowing what may be the rights 
and duties of the parties with respect to operation, mainte-
nance, use and protection is only to invite future contro-
versy. 
Rio Grande endeavored in good faith in its petition for 
rehearing in the case before the Commission to have the 
Commission fully and properly fix and determine all of the 
rights and duties of the two roads incident to the required 
safety devices. In failing to properly and completely deal 
with this subject in its order and in denying Rio Grande's 
petition for rehearing when the matter was specifically 
called to the attention of the Commission, it failed regularly 
to pursue its authority and its orders are arbitrary and 
capricious. 
IV. 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT 
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY RE· 
QUIRE UNION PACIFIC TRACKAGE BEYOND THE 
POINT OF THE PROPOSED RIO GRANDE CROSSING. 
If a decision of the Commission is supported by sub· 
stantial evidence, then, under the aut:Q.ority of numerous 
decisions of. this Court, such decision will not be· disturbed 
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upon review. Equally well established, however, is the 
proposition that if a decision of the Commission is not 
supported by substantial evidence it will be set aside. 
Utah Copper c~o. v. Public Utilities Commission 
of Utah et al., 59 U. 191, 203 P. 627; 
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 103 U. 459', 135 P. (2d) 915; 
McCarthy et al. v. Public Service Commission 
et al., 111 U. 489, 184 P. (2d) 220. 
In its application before the Commission Union Pacific 
sought authority to cross certain streets and the tracks of 
Rio Grande for the purpose of extending its trackage from 
Ninth South Street to Seventeenth South Street. There 
was in the application no proposal to extend trackage be-
yond the north line of Seventeenth South Street. In order 
to do so it would have been necessary for Union Pacific to 
seek authority from the Commission to cross Seventeenth 
South Street. This it did not do, and the Commission re-
stricted the application to a consideration of the extension 
of trackage from Ninth South Street to the north line of 
Seventeenth South Street (R. 72, 78). 
The Commission in its report (R. 22) found in part 
that: 
* * * applicant, Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, has been requested by various property own-
ers and by companies and concerns having industrial 
property along Third West Street and south of Ninth 
South Street in Salt Lake 'City to extend industrial 
track to such area to serve such industries as are 
located in that area and to serve additional indus-
tries which are in contemplation of construction and 
location within said area. 
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That applicant, Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, heretofore made application to the Salt Lake 
City Commission and under date of November 1, 
19·49, was granted a franchise by the Salt Lake City 
·Commission giving to it authority to construct, op-
erate and maintain trackage longitudinally along 
said Third West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah from 
Ninth South southerly to Andrew Avenue south of 
Fifteenth South Street in Salt Lake City, at which 
point said trackage will leave the limits of Salt Lake 
City and extend along private property outside of 
the City limits to the northern boundary of Seven-
teenth South Street. A copy of said ordinance was 
submitted as Exhibit I at the time of the hearing 
upon said application and is on file with the Commi~ 
sion and made a part hereof by reference. 
That because of requests that have been made 
of applicant, Union Pacific Railroad ~Company, by 
property owners in said area and because of rapid 
industrial growth in said area, both with respect to 
industries. located there and others ·projected for 
early construction, the convenience and necessity of 
the public generally, and of business and industry 
located and to be located in said area require the 
immediate construction of said industry trackage; 
that the granting of the application will not be det-
rimental to the best interests of the public but will 
tend to serve its interests better. 
Witnesses were called by Union Pacific, testifying with 
respect to the need: of railroad trackage between Ninth 
South. Street and the north line of Rio Grande's right of 
way. The testimony of all these witnesses. may be placed 
to one side in connection with the inquiry under the above 
designated point. So far as Rio Gran de is concerned, Union 
Pacific may extend: its trackage all the way from Ninth 
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South Street to the north line of Rio Grande's right of way. 
We are here concerned only with whether public convenience 
and necessity was shown by the evidence to require the 
extension of Union Pacific trackage south of Rio Grande's 
right of way. 
Southerly of Rio Grande's right of way and northerly 
of Seventeenth South Street, there is but one parcel of 
land, being the south half of the Geary Estates property. 
This parcel is bounded along its northerly line by the right 
of way and trackage of Rio Grande. The only pertinent 
testimony introduced by Union Pacific with respect to the 
development of this parcel came from the real estate. broker 
Bowman. The substance of his testimony as heretofore 
pointed out is that he had been working upon the industrial 
development of the tract for some two years, that inquiries 
were presently being invited from industries. desiring to 
locate on this parcel. At the time of his testimony no in-
dustry had yet determined to locate thereon, the develop-
ment of the parcel being in the inquiry stage. He. knew of 
the location of Rio Grande trackage abutting upon the 
parcel but no contact had ever been made by him with Rio 
Grande looking to the furnishing of trackage facilities to 
any industry. Wholly without regard to the testimony of 
the witness Bradford respecting the solicitation by Rio 
Grande to locate industries along its trackage (R. 133-134), 
how can it be found from the testimony of Union Pacific 
that public convenience and necessity require the extension 
of Union Pacific trackage over the tracks and right of way 
of Rio Grande and into the south half of the Geary Estates 
property? 
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The contention may be made here that the Commission 
was entitled to look beyond_ the scope of the Union Pacific 
application into an area south of Seventeenth South Street 
in connection with the crossing of.· Rio Gran de's right of 
way and tracks. If such contention were made, the answer 
is found in the proceedings here under review. At the out-
set Rio Grande raised the question as to the scope of the 
application. Union Pacific was then afforded an opportun-
ity to amend and republish, had it seen fit to do so. It 
elected, however, to proceed under its application as filed 
(R. 70~72)., and the Commission, as above indicated, proper-
ly restricted the scope of the application. It is this applica-
tion so restricted and the proceedings taken thereunder 
which are here for review. ·Whatever Union Pacific may 
do or intend to do south of the north line of Seventeenth 
South Street is outside the scope of this review and should 
not be here considered or drawn upon to support the order 
and decision of the Commission in this case. 
CONCLUSION. 
In approving the application of Union Pacific and in 
granting the authority there sought, the Commission failed 
to observe the boundaries of· its jurisdiction. It undertook 
to exercise an identical authority with respect to public 
crossings of streets and the private crossing of one railroad 
over the property and tracks of · another. Its jurisdiction 
over the private crossing involved is restricted to fixing 
the point of crossing and the terms of installation, opera-
tion, maintenance, use and protection of the crossing facil-
ities. In undertaking to empower Union Pacific immediately 
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to commence the construction of the proposed track and to 
construct and maintain the same over the tracks and prop-
erty of Rio Grande, the Commission attempted to exercise 
the judicial function of ·granting to Union Pacific rights in 
the property of Rio Grande and exceeded the jurisdiction 
conferred upon it by law. 
The Commission's order would enable Union Pacific 
to enter upon, use and occupy the property of Rio Grande 
without compensation, in violation of the provisions of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of 
the United States. 
The Commission properly assumed jurisdiction of the 
matter of crossing facilities, but in requiring the installation 
of safety devices without making any provision for the 
operation, maintenance, use and protection of the same, it 
left the parties in doubt and uncertainty as to the rights 
and duties of each, and the cost and expense which each 
might be required to bear and thereby failed reguarly to 
pursue its authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
This review relates to the application of Union Pacific 
to extend its trackage in Third West Street from Ninth 
South to the north line of Seventeenth South Street, but 
we are here concerned only with the crossing of Rio Grande's 
tracks and right of way and the serving of the area southerly 
of Rio Grande's right of way and northerly of Seventeenth 
South Street. Within this area there is but one parcel of 
land, bounded on its north line entirely by the right of way 
and trackage of Rio Grande. There is no substantial evi-
dence in the record that any public convenience and neces-
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sity require the proposed Rio Grande crossing to serve an~ 
industry which may locate upon this small parcel of land-
The order and decision of the Commission should b$ 
set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS, 
Attorneys for P etitionerl. 
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